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IN THE SUPRmtB COURT 
OF THE STATE OF trrAH 
-- - - -
JOON J. SWEENEY, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
HAPPY VALLEY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and 
Re·apondent. 
- ~ . - - -
• . 
. 
. 
• • 
Case No. 10259 
- --------- -
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
----- ------
PRELlMINARY STATEMENT 
Thie case, involving as it does a record of 
1261 pages, is rather complicated as to the facts · 
... 
involved. A correct statement and understanding of 
the facts, as well as the author~ties cited, is 
essential to a fair appraisal as to the respective 
tights and duties of the parties. 
In its Brief, Responde~t takes issue with 
the Statement·of Facts as contained in Appellant's 
Brief and submits its own Statement of Facts (Reap. 
Br. p. 4). Rule 75(p)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
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procedure, directs that if Respondent controverts 
the Statement of Facts as set out in Appellant's 
Brief, "• •• he shall state wherein such statement 
is inconsistent with the facts. • • " Respondent, 
though levelling a general charge that Appellant made 
erroneous and misleading citations of fact, cited no 
... 
specific instances where this was the case. In a 
carefuLreading of Appellant's Brief, it is diffi• 
cult to find any statement inconsistent with the 
Record, or for that matter, inconsistent with the 
Statement of Facts made by Respondent. 
To the contrary, however, the Statement of 
Facts set out by Respondent is replete with argu-
ment, supposition, conclusion and misquotes from the 
Record. This liberty with the Record introduces neW 
material which we believe justifies a reply thereto. 
A reply is likewise justified, we feel, to the mis• 
application and misconstruction, of case authority 
·•'1 
which likewise introddced:; new material for .. the 
Court's consideration. 
Under Poin~ I,.we shall ap~cifically indicate 
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wherein Respondent's Statement of Facts is incon-
sistant with the facts. Under Point II, we shall 
specifically indicate wherein we feel certain of the 
authorities cited by Respondent are not in point. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
· IN ITS STATEMENT OF FACTS, THE RESPONDENT 
HAS MADE STATEMENTS INCONSISTENT wrm THE 
FACTS AND MISQUOTED THE RECORD. 
1, At page 5 of its Brief, Respondent states, 
"The contract provided, inter alia, that 
that Happy Valley would purchase under 
contract from third parties the selected 
acreage •••• " (Emphasis added) 
We find no such provision in the contract as 
to future purchase of the selected acreage. To the 
contrary, the contract does say: 
"THAT WHEREAS, First Party (Happy Valley) 
is the owner of or is entitled to sell 
certain land situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, consisting of approximately 
three hundred and sixty-six (366) acres, 
hereinafter referred to as 'Entire Premises', 
and more particularly described in Exhibit 
A attached hereto and bj reference made a 
part hereof; and • • • " (R. 137) 
This invention of fact by Respondent is, of 
course, significant. When considered with other 
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misstatements as hereinafter set out, the pattern 
from which Respondent cuts the cloth of its case 
becomes obvious. They would have us believe that 
this transaction was a scheme, a land promotion, a 
development, and that the risk thereof should have 
been assumed by both parties. When it started to 
sour, as they claim, because of "unforeseen" and "tin-
expected" difficulties (Resp. Br., pp 6-7), then 
they were justified in self deals and other trans-
actions not contemplated in the contract ~o save the 
day. 
2, On page 6 of its Brief, Respondent states: 
11 6. It was proposed under the 1957 con-
tract that costs of acquiring the 366 acres 
as well as subdivision and development ex-
penses of the residential.properties were 
to be substantially financed through pro-
ceeds from property sales within the 
development." 
0 
We do not find where this was proposed under 
the 1957 contract. The proposal was that First 
Party would : 
" ••• develop said Entire Premises and to 
subdivide a portion thereof for residential 
building lots. • • " (R. 137) 
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It was represented by Respondent at the time 
it signed the contract that, ". • • it has the right 
to enter into a contract to sell said Entire Prem-
iaes, or any part thereof ••• " (R. 129) 
It may have been the undisclosed intent of 
Respondent that proceeds of sales would keep the 
payments current on real estate contracts and improve-
ments (~. 367), but this was not proposed under the 
1957 contract. 
3. On page 6 of its Brief, Respondent refers to 
''unforeseen difficulties," "unforeseen events • • • 
unanticipated by the contract." It is the grossest 
type of supposition to tickle the imagination as to 
what was foreseen, unforeseen, anticipated or unan• 
ticipated under the contract. The contract sp~aks 
for itself. 
4, . On page 6 of its Brief, Respohdent states: 
"(a) Sweeney, acting for Second Party, 
notified Happy Valley tQat Willow Creek 
Country Club required fee title to the 
property underlying the golf course 
facilities. This was not envisioned by 
the 1957 contract." 
In the first place, it was not Mr. Sweeney, 
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~cting for the Second Party, who requested fee title 
for the Country Club. )l'he request was made by 
If. • • Club representatives, including Mr. Sweeney, 
II 
. . . (R. 534) 
In the sec~nd place, it·was envisioned by the 
1957 contract that fee title would be given to the 
Willow Creek Country Club. On completion of payment, -· 
Respondent was to " convey a marketable title to 
the Club Premises to the Willow Creek Country Club 
by good and sufficient warranty deed." (R. 139) 
In the third place, ·payment in full and the 
request for fee title ·was made by the Country Club 
in 1959 (R. 1145), just a few months in advance of 
the date of final payment as provided in the con-
tract. (R. 138) 
5. The "unforeseen difficulties" (Resp. Br. p. 6) 
were not and should not have been unforeseen. · At 
least as early as 1958 Respondent anticipated off• 
Bite improvements in the Willow' Creek area. (R. 
1131) Mr. Burton, one of the principals in Respon• 
dent .Company, had engaged in the development and 
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promotion of a great number of subdivision proper-
ties prior to the Happy Valley development (R. 1137-
1138). Development of lots was not held up by un-
foreseen difficulties with the County, but because 
of lack of funds (R. 530). And lack of funds is 
difficult to imagine since $150,000.00 had been re-
ceived from the Country Club in 1958 and 1959 (R. 
529). Improvements in Subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 were 
completed in the forepart of 1959 (R. 530). 
6. As to the activity in the market during 1959 and 
1960 (Resp. Br., p. 6), it would appear Respondent 
discharged its sales agent sometime in 1958 (R. 
522), accused its sales agent of a premature sales 
program and didn't authorize the resumption of sales 
activity until January 12, 1960. (Exhibit 29-P) 
7. On page 8 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent 
states: 
''Sweeney did not want to buy any lots at 
$3,000.00, and did not offer to buy after 
they were platted and available for sale." 
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This is a twisting of the Record. The testi-
mony was that SWeeney had never been offered any 
lots for $3,000.00 and at the time of trial was not 
interested in buying any lots at that price (R. 1082, 
1083). He attempted to purchase lots in 1958 and 
1959 and was refused (R. 1085, 1086). He did not 
attempt a purchase after that time. 
8. On page 8 of Respondent's Brief, it is stated 
that in January, 1962, Happy Valley sold to 25 Associ-
ates, Inc. and R. E. Mcconaughy, 31 acres for resi-
dential purposes in consideration for 50.9% of the 
Second Party interest, having a reasonable cash 
value of $42,908.00. 
There is no testimony in the Record as to the 
proposed use contemplated by the Grantee, that there 
was any restriction on the sale, or that, in fact, 
the 31 acres would be used for residential purposes. 
Nor is the phrase "reasonable cash value" found in 
the testimony, this phrase later finding its way into 
the Findings of Fact by the Court. 
The figure of $42,908.00 was arrived at by a 
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mathematical process contributed by Mr. Burton, a 
principal of Respondent Corporation. (R. 1152) 
The basis of this computation was a figure by which 
Mr. Safford, one of the Second Party, lost his inter-
, est in default of a sum of money owing and overdue 
from Mr. Safford to Mr. Graff, another principal of 
Respondent Corporation. (R. 519, 520) There is no 
evidence or testimony that the 25 Associates, Inc., 
and Mcconaughy ever talked in terms of $42,908.00 as 
the value of their interest. Since in May, 1960, 
the Second Party, as noted by Respondent (Resp. Br., 
p. 39), equated the value of 75 lots at $3,333.00 
per lot and valued its total interest at $250,000.00 
(R. 1095), it is hard to believe that 25 Associates, 
Inc. and Mcconaughy, representing 50.9% of Second 
Party, were willing to sell their interest in January, 
1962, for $42,908.00. Fixing a figure of $42,908.00 
as a "reasonable cash value" for the 50. 9% interest, 
and then translating that figure as the "gross pro-
ceeds" realized from the sale of 31 acres for the 
Purpose of an accounting to Mr. Sweeney, was possibly 
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the most patent error of the trial court. 
9, Though perhaps of minor consequence, it is 
noted that on page 15 of Respondent's Brief the 
statement is made, 
"To begin with, not one count of Sweeney's 
Complaint, Amended Complaint, or Second 
Amended Complaint remotely suggests or 
raises an ex contractu claim." 
If this is the case, then apparently there 
was a grave misunderstanding by Counsel for Respondent. 
In its "Memorandum In Support of Defendants 1 Motion," 
Respondent states: 
"This action was commenced by Plaintiff 1s 
original Complaint which appeared to be 
bottomed upon an alleged breach of a 
written agreement." (R. 111) 
As to the Amended Complaint, Counsel for 
Respondent states: 
"In his alleged Second Cause of Action, 
plaintiff apparently contends that there 
had been a breach of the agreement, ••• " 
(R. 112) 
And further refers to the Second Cause of A~tion as: 
"II. The Alleged Second Cause of Action 
(Breach of Contract)." 
That Counsel for Appellant always considered 
the Second Cause of Action as one involving a breach 
- 11 -
of contract is evidenced by his language in a Trial 
Memorandum. (R. 104) 
10. • On page 41 of its Brief, Respondent quotes from 
and refers to "SWeeney' s Trial Brief." This Trial 
Brief is not in the record nor was it designated as 
a part of the record. Referral thereto would appear 
to be improper. As a matter of fact, there is no 
such thing as "Sweeney's Trial Brief." Mr. Sweeney 
did file an instrument entitled "Plaintiff's Opening 
Argument" in which the paragraph quoted by Respon-
dent is stated. In reply to Respondent's suggestion 
of inconsistency and bad faith on the part of 
Sweeney in accepting the off-site improvement cost 
as "gross proceed" in relation to the transaction 
with Estates, Inc., we ask the Court to remember that, 
in fact, Sweeney had been put to the rack. Respon-
dent had refused to account for said sale on the 
basis of the development of said two and one-half 
acres as residential lots, which would, of course, 
have been considerably more. In the spirit of compro• 
miae, Sweeney was willing, at that time, to pick up 
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any crumbs Respondent was willing to throw out. But 
accepting the $13,742.85 figure as the gross proceeds 
for the transfer does not mean that the manner in 
which said figure was determined was correct or that 
said accounting was consistent with the provisions 
of the contract. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT HAS MISCONSTRUED, MISAPPLIED AND 
MISINTERPRETED CERTAIN AlITHORITIES AS CITED. 
Apparently it is the position of the Respon-
dent that though there were certain related questions 
of law involved, the nub Qf the suit was for an 
accounting and injunction. (Resp. Br., p. 14). 
! Assuming the major issues to be equitable in nature, 
Respondent then quotes Norback vs. Board of Directors 
2!. Church Extension Soc., 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 
(1934) as final authority for the position that 
Appellant has no right to a jury trial. (Resp. Br., 
p, 20) With a flip of the hand they summarily d~s-
miss the later case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 
119 Utah 204, 225 p, 2d 739 (1950) in which the Court 
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materially changed and expanded the Norback rule. 
(Resp. Br., p. 23) 
Appellant, of course, takes the position that 
the main or primary issues involved were legal. Re-
spondent recognized these legal issues to be the 
interpretation of the 1957 contract, the issue as to 
whether Sweeney was entitled to an accounting on 
"gross proceeds of sales" or "market value of the 
properties" or some other standard, the issue of 
good faith as to sales to the Directors. (Resp. Br., 
p. 14) These issues we suggest are the very guts of 
the case. " The fact that equitable relief may 
be prayed for, to carry into effect the judgment 
based upon the legal issues is not sufficient to 
deprive either party of his rights to have the legal 
issues submitted to the jury." (State ex rel Hansen 
~s. Hart, 26 Utah, 220, 72 P. 938, as quoted in 
fu>rback v. Board of Directors, supra) The mistake 
made by the trial judge in this case was that he 
couldn't separate the right involved from the remedy 
sought. In proper perspective, Appellant's position 
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is perfectly consistent with the Norback rule. 
But assuming, as Respondent contends, that 
the equitable issues were the nub of the suit, then 
what? In the case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 
119 U. 204, 225 P. 2d 739 (1950), the trial court 
refused a jury trial on the basis of the Norback rule 
regarding major, minor issues. (225 P. 2d, p. 750) 
The Supreme Court rejected the Norback rule, or at 
least materially altered the rule, by stating: 
'~ppraised in light of the California rule, 
the Norback case is apparently correct in 
result, but the rule there laid down as to 
when litigants are entitled to a trial by 
jury, which we have quoted above, cannot be 
reconciled with the California rule which 
we have approved and adopted in this opin-
ion. There may be certain types of cases, 
although none occur to us now, in which the 
issues of fact in the legal cause of action 
are so intertwined with the issues of fact 
in the equitable cause of action that they 
cannot be separated for the purpose of trial 
by jury. Only then would it seem that the 
court should determine whether the major 
issue or issued are legal or equitable and 
grant or deny a jury trial accordingly. 
Othersise the parties should be entitled.to 
a jury trial on the issues of fact in the 
legal cause of action." (225 P. 2d p. 750) 
We would submit, therefore, that the Norback 
rule, relied upon by Respondent, is not the rule as 
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as to the right to a jury trial where mixed legal and 
equitable issues are involved in the same proceeding. 
Regardless of the paramount object of Plaintiff's 
action, the primary relief sought, either party is 
entitled to a jury trial on the issues of fact in the 
legal cause of action. 
In passing, we refer to the opinion of Justice 
Wade concurring and dissenting in part in the Valley 
Mortuary case. Justice Wade refers to Section 
78-21-1, U.C.A. 1953, which provides: 
"In actions for the recovery of specific 
real or personal property, with or with-
out damages, or for money claimed as due 
upon contract or as damages for breach of 
contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact 
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial 
is waived." (225 P. 2d, p. 752) 
Justice Wade then states: 
"This section fixes the right of a jury 
trial on all issues of fact involved in de-
termining whether any of the kinds of re-
lief therein specified should be granted 
and if so the amount and extent thereof. 
Under its provisions the right to such trial 
does not depend on whether the issues pre-
sented are legal or equitable, nor on wheth-
er that kind of action would have beeq 
maintainable in a law court under the dual 
court system. The test under this statute 
is whether the kind of relief specified 
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therein is sought in the action. If such 
relief is sought, then a jury trial is 
granted on all issues of fact involving 
such relief but it does not require a jury 
trial on issues of fact involved in the 
granting of other kinds of relief which is 
sought in the same action. " (225 P. 2d 
p. 752) (Emphasis added) 
Justice Wade then suggests that if we would 
follow the statute the problem of determining when a 
jury trial should be granted would be greatly simpli-
fied and notes the confusion perpetrated by the law-
1 
equity distinction, especially under the New Rules of 
Procedure with law and equity administered in one 
Court. ( 225 P. 2d, p. 7 53) 
The whole gist and basic purpose of this action 
has been to recover money claimed as due upon con-
tract. Applying the thinking of Justice Wade, it 
wuld appear that Appellant is entitled to a jury 
trial on the issues of fact involved. 
Respondent, in its Brief at page 23, also 
makes fleeting reference to the case of Dairy Queen 
1 Y.:.Jlood 1 369 U.S. 469, 8 L. Ed 2d 44 (1962) as quoted 
by Appellant. It is not claimed that the Dairy Queen 
case is stare decisis or binding upon this Court• 
- 17 -
It is claimed that the rule of that case is prece-
dent where both legal and equitable issues are in-
volved in the same proceeding and that the rationale 
of the case is very persuasive. Respondent goes on 
to suggest that in any event Utah has established 
a different constituional precedent in regard to 
jury trial and cites the cases of West v. West, 16 U. 
2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965), Lane v. Peterson, 68 U. 
585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926), and Kimball v. McCormack, 
70 U. 189, 259 Pac. 331 (1926) as establishing said 
precedent. Interestingly enough, the issue of a 
jury trial was not raised in any one of those cases. 
It is difficult to see where those cases establish 
any precedent whatever in relation to the problem 
treated in the Dairy Queen v. Wood case, .to-wit: 
the right to treat by jury where legal issues are 
incidental to equitable issues. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears to us that the case never really 
got off the ground. Court and Counsel became mired 
in collateral issues. To state the facts accurately 
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has been difficult. Basically, the question of 
the case is whether Defendant-Respondent performed 
as it was obligated to do under a written contract. 
Errors made in the trial court prevented Plaintiff• 
Appellant from an adequate presentation of its 
case. 
It goes without argument that the right to 
a jury trial as guaranteed by our Constitution and 
provided by statute should be jealously guarded. 
Particularly would this seem to be so in consider• 
at ion of the very nature of the instant case. Per• 
sonalities were involved and the plausibility of 
their statements is of vital importance. Volum-
inous testimony as to property evaluation and the 
reasonableness thereof was involved. Such circum-
stance would tax the composite thinking of eight 
men, let alone one man, regardless of the cut of 
his robe or the wisdom of his judgment. Appellant 
is entitled to a jury trial of the legal issues of 
fact involved. The judgment of the trial court 
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should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & 
Henriod 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
